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Abstract
Based on a framework grounded in the institution-based view, this paper
addresses the extent of global patent system integration and development. Our
findings suggest that nations’ patent systems have yet ‘met’ the ‘international
standards’, despite national and international endeavor toward this goal. The
impact of international institutions on national institutions is reflected in the
process rather than the outcome. Among the three components of patent
systems across 88 nations, conformity is the strongest for ‘patent mechanism',
operations is the most diverse for ‘patent administration’ and ‘patent
enforcement’ does not form a cross-nation divide due to most nations being
moderate enforcers.
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Integration and Divergence of Patent Systems across National and
International Institutions

1. INTRODUCTION
The relationship between institutions and international business (IB) has
gained much attention in recent years. The focus of the relationship seems to
center around institutional diversity across countries, its implications for
multinationals, and their business (Delios & Henisz, 2003; Chao & Kumar,
2009; a special issue was dedicated on this topic in the Journal of
International Business Studies, volume 39, 2008). Several institutional topics
associated with the patent system were also published in business journals.
Examples include the role of patent system on foreign direct investment (Luo,
2001; Khoury & Peng, 2011), culture impact on patent system understanding
(Yang, 2005), patent impact on industries (Ghauri & Rao, 2009) and
significance of patent protection for business (McGaughey, Liesch & Poulson,
2000. We define the patent system as a nation’s system to legislate patent laws
(stipulating national patent policy), administer patent filing and granting
(patent offices’ functions) and enforce patent protection (judicial actions to
resolve disputes and execute verdicts). National patent systems interact with,
interrelate to and inter-depend on one another, harmonized by international
patent organizations (i.e., World Intellectual Property Organization – WIPO
and World Trade Organization – WTO). In short, institution-IB linkages
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indicate the need for international institutions and opportunities of crossnational convergence under globalization.
International institutions, however, imply the complexity for IB that might
lead to ineffective global strategy execution (Griffith, 2010). The complexity
is interstate and inter-dependent: “The institutional environment is not a
parameter but a rich constellation of interdependent structures and systems
within a country, across dyadic pairs of countries and at the level of the
international state system” (Eden, 2010, p. 175). The complexity is also
associated with the relationship between national and international institutions
where international organizations attempt to integrate nations with a set of
standards for the purpose of efficient and effective multi-lateral business
activities. International compliance of patent systems across countries is a
typical example of such a complexity. Nations are required to meet the
minimum standards set out by major international patent organizations as a
trade-off to become a member and benefit from integrating with the rest of the
world.
International institutions of patent systems are important for national
institutions due to the indispensable links between patent systems and
international business. First, the inabilities of countries to generate sufficient
technologies for economic growth decide that a shortcut is international
technology transfer through IB activities. However, nations’ desire to access
foreign technology will not be realized if owners do not feel that their patent
rights are protected (Bosworth & Yang, 2000). Second, exporting and
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investing countries realize the importance of protecting their indigenous
technology, they thus require policy guidance when considering transferring
technology to unfamiliar countries (Bosworth & Yang, 2000). Third, external
pressure from major developed countries has also intensified patent-IB links.
A series of cross-border disputes have pressurized nations to negotiate and
sign memoranda (Sherwood, 1997). Finally, patent system differences
between developed and developing countries lead to intensive international
intervention. As a result, the Trade-Related aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights Agreement (TRIPS) signed in 1995 among WTO members establishes
a direct link between patent systems and trade, and to resolve dispute across
countries.
Given the patents-IB links, research seems yet to catch up with the
realities of fully understanding the convergence and divergence of patent
systems across borders, particularly its association with international patent
system. For example, it seems unclear as to what specific role the WTO and
WIPO, as international institutions, have played in national institutions, and
how patent systems, as a formal institution should be understood.
Theoretically, awareness of these details enables extension and specification
on institutional understanding. In practice, understanding of international
inventive activities, research and development, and technological
advancement help inform firms of the level of patent risks associated with IB
activities, allowing them to take strategic measures to minimize them
(Ostergard, 2000). Our research thus intends to contribute knowledge from
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this perspective by addressing two questions: (1) Have nations integrated their
patent systems under the influence of international institutions? (2) How are
the three components of patent systems compared and contrasted in terms of
development across the world?
2. CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT
2.1. Conceptual Development
We propose a comprehensive framework (Figure 1) to examine patent system
development with three components: patent mechanism, administration and
enforcement. ‘Patent mechanism’ means patent laws and regulations, and their
legislature to safeguard ownership rights and public interests. ‘Patent
administration’ is governmental functions to examining and granting patent
rights, interpreting laws, supervising patent activities and resolve disputes
without going through legal proceedings. ‘Patent enforcement’ refers to
judicial systems for patent dispute settlement and execution (e.g., court
proceedings and special courts to handle patent cases).
< Figure 1>
The three components are interrelated to influence how the patent system
works. First, the three components are inseparable to one another. Patent
mechanism is a patent policy on paper that requires patent administration to
function and monitor related patent activities, meanwhile, patent enforcement
needs to be in place when disputes occur. Second, the relationship lies within
the national institution where countries decide how a patent system should
serve the state interest and its relationship with other nations. Finally,
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international patent institutions influence national systems and coordinate
cross-national patent activities.
While a patent system is nation-based, it does not isolate itself from
international institutions for two reasons. First, the degree of influence
depends on how a nation is integrated with the rest of the world. For example,
if a nation becomes a member of the WTO, it has an obligation to comply with
TRIPS. A national patent system should reflect on international standards.
Second, nations depend on one another. When they have strong trade ties, they
desire compatible patent systems to ensure smooth bilateral business.
However, how integrated or disintegrated of nations’ patent systems is unclear
and requires further examination (Weismann, 2010).
Both scholars and practitioners recognize the indispensable nature of the
three components for patent systems, but an integrated justification and
examination has yet taken place. Academically, four major pieces of work
have assessed global patent systems (elaborated when formulating
hypotheses), but our paper appears to be the first to examine these three
components systematically. In practice, nations emphasize patent mechanism
as an important legal matter, and both patent mechanism and enforcement are
explicitly stipulated in international treaties, conventions and agreements. As
for patent administration, though little researched, it is important to address
the efficiency of granting patent rights and handling patent disputes, and
enhance public awareness of government policies (Sherwood, 1997).
Patent administration is also emphasized in patent system practice.
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First, WIPO requires the establishment of satisfactory patent administration in
national patent strategies (WIPO, 2005) to permit “coordination of policies
relating to innovation and IP asset development … [such as] the coordination
and/or consolidation of … [IP] offices”. Second, an effective patent
administration demonstrates governments’ commitment to patent activities,
including incentivizing innovation. Thus, a country’s patent administration
also reflects government efficiency in granting patent rights (Sherwood,
1997).
2.2. Theoretical Foundations: Institution-based View
Institutions - ‘rule of the game’ (structures & activities) - deal with humanly
devised constraints for the purpose of guiding human interaction, maintaining
stability and reducing uncertainty, and governing social behavior (Scott,
2001). Informal institutions are imbedded within culture (e.g., norms) and
formal institutions are associated with legal and regulatory activities (Peng,
Wang & Jiang, 2008), which seem to create a larger hazard to multinationals
(Slangen & Beugelsdijk, 2010). Our study focuses on the latter form.
Institutions capture the complex and changing nature of environments and
its relationship with organizations (Kiggundu, Jorgensen & Hafsi, 1983;
Rugman & Verbeke, 1998). Institutional pressure steers strategic choice and
therefore firm performance (Delios & Henisz, 2003; Hoskisson, Eden, Lau &
Wright, 2000; Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson & Peng, 2005). The interplay of
institutions and organizations leads firms to adopt institution-based strategies
to overcome constraints. As a result, institution-based view impacts on firm
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decisions across borders from organizational founding and failure,
organizational conformity, competitive advantage, partner selection to interorganizational relationship (Bjorkman, Fey & Park, 2007; Li & Filer, 2007;
Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik, & Peng, 2009). It should, therefore, be treated as a
main and direct driver of firm behavior instead of background information
(Peng, 2003).
Institution-based view attaches a particular relevance to the rule of law
(Roy & Oliver, 2009). Weak rules of law increase the uncertainty of patent
protection for owners and affect their legitimate returns (Delios & Henisz,
2003), thus indicating its impact on business strategy decisions. The stronger
the patent protection is in a country, the higher the scale of internationalization
(Allred & Park, 2007; Chung & Beamish, 2005; Luo, 2001). When it comes to
R&D partnership selection, firms opt for joint venture rather than contractual
agreement to protect their ownership right (Hagedoorn, Cloodt & Kranenburg,
2005) and adopt hierarchical governance when IP protection is weak (Oxley,
1999).
Literature on institution-based view suggests the importance of the
patent system – the national institution on strategic behaviors and businesses
and its relationship with international institution. First, patent laws are
important for IB due to their impact and complexity (e.g., a lack of
international standards). Thus, the convergence of integrated patent systems
appears to be an IB ambition to reduce transaction costs. Second, patent
systems as a national institution are pressured to comply with ‘international
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standards’ given the globalization trend. This is because internationally
complied patent systems would aid cross-border business efficiency by
reducing uncertainties, and help firms be less dependent on contractual
surveillance (Walder, 1995; Gao, Murray, Kotabe, & Lu, 2010).
2.3. Hypotheses: Integration and Divergence of Global Patent Systems
2.3.1. Global Patent Integration
International institution theory emphasizes universalism, that is, to allow
nations to have a shared destiny (Ruggie, 1992). This shared destiny is driven
by the need of national institutions for global harmonization. That is,
international institutions are in demand so that certain arising interstate
sensitive issues (i.e., security, diplomatic disputes, and intellectual property)
are resolved and mutual benefits can be gained (i.e., trade, foreign direct
investment). IP has been on the agenda of international institutions particularly
in the past two decades due to nations’ intensified technology transfer
(patents), cross-border business dealing (trademarks) and cultural exchanges
(copyrights). Nations’ call for institutionalizing certain rules helps countries
toward a broad integration thus, a direction for harmonization.
International institutions of patent systems are an integral part of and
a great influence on nation-based institutions. These are a ‘philosophical or
culture institution’ (Massel, 1973, p. 673) that set a minimum standard for
nations to comply with toward integration across nations. Global patent
integration considers how countries have conformed to international patent
mechanisms by ratifying treaties, conventions and agreements (Ferrantino,
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1993). It also looks at nations’ administrative efficiency in patent filing and
granting (Sherwood, 1997). Moreover, it examines how nations resolve crossborder patent disputes and settlement (Ostergard, 2000). While the
interrelated, interacting and interdependent relationships among nations have
increased the need for global integration, countries seem to operate
independently within the broad international patent system due to their
different institutional background.
With efforts toward integration of international institutions, treaties,
conventions and agreements are set for nations to comply. This includes the
objectives and functioning of the three-component patent system in the
international context. International treaties, conventions and agreements serve
as ‘models’ to assist nations in drafting their IP laws. Of the 28 treaties,
conventions and agreements, 25 are under the auspices of WIPO; among the
others, TRIPS (under the WTO) aims to ‘fill the gaps’ in respect of judicial
enforcement.
International administration allows for a single application of a patent
within all (or selected) members to be made to a designated WIPO Bureau
from the applicant’s country. Thus, an owner can gain worldwide protection
for a patent in all WIPO member states (the WTO has no administrative
system to handle international filing).
Enforcement represents the major difference between these two
organizations. WIPO has limited enforcement power. If two countries have a
patent dispute, a WIPO tribunal may arrange a settlement. However, if one
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refuses to implement the verdict, the organization has no power of control. A
WTO settlement, on the contrary, is enforceable. Thus, when a member
refuses to implement the verdict, the WTO can instruct the complainant to
take actions (e.g., embargos or trade sanctions) against the offender.
TRIPS integrates nations’ patent systems more extensively than other
treaties, conventions and agreements, in four ways. First, it is the only
agreement that directly links patents with trade (WTO, 1995) and production
and services. Second, it is an agreement that balances stakeholder interests
between rights holders’ and general public (WTO, 1995, Article 7). Third,
TRIPS members are obliged to implement enforcement. Judicial execution is
monitored by the WTO at national and international levels. Finally, TRIPS is
the most comprehensive multilateral agreement on IP because it sets minimum
standards for legal mechanisms, procedures, enforcement remedies and
dispute settlements (WTO, 1995, Articles 1 & 41).
Accordingly, one part of our arguments emerges based on the need of
integration toward international institutions for patent systems. First,
international patent system development has a long history of convergence.
Since 1883, member states (now 184 members for WIPO and 153 for the
WTO) have been active toward international compliance. Most member states
could have met the minimum requirements set out by WIPO and the WTO to
institutionalize their patent system. Second, relevant treaties, conventions and
agreements in WIPO and WTO have been the set standards for patent policy
and actions. Take the patent law in China for example. It was drafted on the
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basis of the Paris Convention, Patent Treaty and revised according to TRIPS.
Third, as a requirement of entry into the WTO, members must ratify a new
entrant’s eligibility. This allows members to look at bilateral relationship and
the consistency of policy stipulation in patent systems. On the basis of the
above discussions, we expect that
H1: Nations’ patent systems are likely to be integrated with the international
patent system; that is, nations have met the minimum requirements stipulated
by international organizations.
2.3.2. Divergence in Patent System Development
Functionalism of institutions emphasizes that despite the demand for
integration in the international realm, states are the units of authority with
distinctive national interests and transaction costs (Scholte, 2001). That is,
these territory-based authorities have their own needs and wants for
technology, trade, and cultural exchanges. This means that global integration
among nations may receive national institution’s resistance when state interest
and sovereignty are compromised.
National institutions are the key for international transformation because
they are the adopters, adapters and implementers for global patent system
integration. National institutions stress the importance of sovereigntism to
allow nations to preserve their own independence. Thus, universal jurisdiction
has its limitations (Weismann, 2010): no uniformity in nations codifying
international rules and regulations; hard to enforce international laws; and
nations are free to ratify or not ratify the treaties, conventions and agreements.
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Given the highly recognized country variations, international institutions
are obliged to ensure global integration is functional, comprehensive enough
to consider transaction costs and sovereign interests by setting minimum
standards. To ensure functional global integration, nations focus on specific,
sensitive areas of national interests, such as intellectual property. Therefore,
global patent integration is the functional integration played by both national
and international institutions. As a result, nations tend to have varied
development in the process of implementing their patent system.
Sporadic research has recognized such development variations with four
studies worth deliberation (Rapp & Rozek, 1990; Sherwood, 1997; Ginarte &
Park, 1997; Ostergard, 2000). Rapp and Rozek (1990) measure the strength of
patent laws in 159 countries on a zero-to-five scale (0 indicates ‘no patent
laws’ and 5 ‘patent laws consistent with the minimum standard set out by the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce’). This study examines patent mechanism and
compares patent system differences and the impact on economic development.
It also recognizes the importance of enforcement without providing any
measures. Empirically, though, this study has much wider geo-coverage to
examine patent systems than any other research.
Sherwood (1997) studies 18 countries’ strength of IP systems, based on
personal knowledge, experience and professional interviews using a score
ranging between 0 and 103. The score takes account of enforcement,
administration, laws, treaties and public commitment (U.S. State Department,
1989-1995). It seems to be the only prior work recognizing the strength of IP
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administration by testing the transparency (public awareness of decision
making), efficiency (time scale to deal with IP issues) and costs of
administration.
Sherwood’s findings (1997) show that patent mechanism is the highest in
development, and administration the lowest. Sherwood also addresses the
importance of enforcement by measuring judicial independence, ability to
request court action and the rights to take civil actions. Like Rapp and Rozek
(1990), however, Sherwood (1997) did not examine the performance of
enforcement. Thus, it is unclear whether these enforcement measures will
result in an efficient outcome of patent protection. Moreover, the separate
strength of different IP laws cannot be identified, as they are all examined as a
whole.
Ginarte and Park (1997) propose an index construction to study what
determines patent rights using data of 110 countries from 1960 to 1990. The
patent system in each country was measured using five variables - the extent
of coverage, membership of international patent agreements, provisions for the
loss of protection, enforcement mechanisms, and duration of protection
(scaling 0-1 with one indicating the strongest protection). This research
quantifies patent protection and identifies protection determinants by linking
the patent indices with IB activities. It also assesses both patent mechanism
and enforcement based on documentation. It appears to be the only
longitudinal study to address patent system development. Finally, Ostergard
(2000) argues that IP mechanism differs considerably from enforcement in
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terms of development. Using trademark, copyright and patent data from 76
countries, the study shows that 60 countries demonstrate higher scores in
patent mechanism than in enforcement and significant gap between the two.
In summary, prior research all recognizes that patent mechanism is an
essential part of the patent system, and is the most developed component of
the three. The significance of administration and enforcement as part of the
patent system is recognized, but understudied empirically. Relevant findings
are varied and incomplete, and reinforcing the need for further testing and
validation. Prior research also shows a high focus, recognition and
development of patent mechanism, relatively slow development and high
recognition in enforcement, and slow development and low recognition of the
significant role of patent administration.
Linking these empirical studies with the element of functionalism
discussed earlier, we observe the following consistency and contradictions.
Functional international institutions are the exercise of nations to align their
national patent rules and regulations with international treaties, conventions
and agreements. Nations demonstrate their commitment based on state
environment. One important part of the international institution is, thus, to
manage and coordinate states and inter-states (patent administration), and
resolve conflicts (dispute resolution and patent system enforcement).
However, international institutions in the form of resolving conflicts ‘is
historically the least frequent’ due to functional considerations (Ruggie, 1992,
p. 567).
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Given the theory-empirics linkages, this present research would argue that
international institutions as functional institutions emphasize process rather
than implementation. The implementation of patent systems in line with
international institutions lies in each individual state. Stipulating relevant rules
and establishing administrative coordination become the priority for nations.
In addition, while both patent administration and enforcement take time
evolvement to be effective, enforcement probably takes longer time for
experienced judges and lawyers to be in place. Although patent administration
requires many experienced examiners, the process of filing and granting is
more administrative and coordinating, rather than resolving, as in
enforcement.
To sum up, the integration of institutions is conditional of preferences
and capabilities within the national strategic environment (Caporaso, 1992).
Nations pursue universal goals taking account of constraints to them (e.g.,
costs, interdependence, and economy). “[P]robably no two ‘systems’ are
exactly alike”, and commonly “… they operate within the confines of a single
nation” (Massel, 1973, p. 647). Thus, “TRIPS…is a minimum standard…
which allows members to provide more extensive protection of IP if they so
wish. Members are left free to determine the appropriate method of
implementing the provisions of the Agreement within their own legal system
and practice.” (WTO, 1995). In consequence, a lack of global consensus in
both policy and actions is inevitable within and among nations. Thus,
‘resolving issues’ (e.g., enforcing patent protection) becomes more intricate

17

than ‘coordinating matters’ among nations (e.g., procedural requirements of
patent filing). On the above basis, we expect
H2a: Nations are likely to be more developed in patent mechanism than in
patent administration and enforcement.
H2b: Nations are likely to be more developed in patent administration than in
patent enforcement.
3. METHODS
3.1. Research Design
This research adopts four exploratory techniques - secondary data analysis,
experience survey, focus group and two-way design (Cooper & Schindler,
2006) to ‘seek new insights; … to assess phenomena in a new light’ (Robson,
2002, p. 59) and to clarify the suitability and feasibility of the study (Saunders,
Lewis & Thornhill, 2009). Secondary data analysis leads to establishing a
preliminary framework. In this process, we are able to review prior research
and justify why we have examined global patent system development.
The experience survey focuses on interviewing 13 WIPO and WTO
directors and their representation of global patent perspectives is evidenced.
The WIPO development division organized a seminar to examine patent
system measurements in 2007. In this seminar opened by a deputy director
general of WIPO, four experts in the field were invited and presented their
work, including the first author, who presented the preliminary framework of
measuring patent systems. The deputy director general in charge of the
division subsequently had a meeting with the author to discuss the importance
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of establishing a new framework and directed all regional directors to
collaborate. These directors are specialist policy practitioners in the field. That
is, they hold directorship in charge of IP policy and development in different
regions across the world (i.e., North America, South America, South and
Southeast Asia, West Europe, East Europe, Africa, and Middle East).
Their representation is also shown in that all these UN experts have at
least ten-year experience in IP policy and development. Our interviews with
them allow us to find out their overall views on our study (three components
and measurements). While they were confident that the measurements were
objective; patent administration was a logical new factor; and the framework
was concise, they also commented on improving relevant measures.
Subsequently, the improved framework was presented to them again for
further comments.
We have also used a focus group to further improve the framework. This
focus group consists of six people from the IP audit division of WIPO, which
conducts global scale IP audit. These auditors understand the need for a
comprehensive but measurable IP framework. Thus, their input helped us
further revise the patent system framework.
Finally, we have measured the research feasibility through a two-way
design. One way includes conceptualization, operationalization and piloting
with WIPO and WTO directors and a focus group; the other includes
establishing the index and conducting statistical analysis to test whether and
how the framework works.
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3.2. Data Sources
This study examined all 153 WTO members, but drew its conclusions based
on the analysis of 88 countries that form 58% of the population. We excluded
65 countries from the population due to non-available or incomplete dataset.
Some members of developing and least developed countries are not obligated
to implement the compliance of international standards until the end of their
transitional years (e.g., 2016).
Our indexing data are sourced from WIPO, the WTO and national patent
offices. ‘Patent mechanism’ variables are indexed based on the patent laws
and regulations of nations lodged in the ‘Collection of Laws’ on the WIPO
website. ‘Patent administration’ data are indexed based on country information
from WIPO, WTO and national patent offices (national offices were contacted
only when information was unclear). ‘Patent enforcement’ data are drawn
from the “Enforcement Checklist” compiled by the WTO, and member states
are required to report their enforcement progress (Council for TRIPS, 1997).
Where countries have not reported to the WTO, we examine relevant data
based on their laws, annual reports and other available patent information.
We should note the strengths and weaknesses of the patent data we have
used. The WTO and WIPO organize data in a simple, systematic and unified
manner. They are the main sources of data on the global trends of patent system
development and the data are widely used by researchers and practitioners.
These data are compiled based on national government reporting, and the ways
of reporting data may vary across countries. For example, ‘availability of courts
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to handle patent disputes’ can be interpreted in two ways: a special court may
be available to deal with patent disputes, or the court may handle litigations.
The former can be more efficient due to cases being handled in a concentrated
manner, which also helps accumulate related experience. Such variations in the
raw data make it difficult for WIPO and WTO to follow a strictly standardized
approach to compiling and incorporating these data; thus possibly affecting our
indexing scoring.
3.3. Indexing and Measurements
Table 1 details the conceptualization and operationalization for each variable.
The variable selection for each component is based on prior research and
practice of two international patent organizations - WIPO and the WTO. The
index scores allow the patent system of each nation to be reflected in a range
between 0 and 1 for consistency and comparison. ‘0’ indicates that a nation
has made no effort to conform to an international patent standard specific to a
measurement; ‘1’ indicates that a nation has fulfilled (and may even have
surpassed) the minimum standard. We conducted a principal axis component
analysis to test whether the measurements clustered toward each construct.
<Table 1 >
We have examined multi-collinearity between variables in three ways
and concluded its existence can be tolerated within certain thresholds
(Bowerman & O’Connell, 1990; Hair et al., 2009). Our results show the
correlation coefficients are mostly below 0.70 with the largest value at 0.83
(see detail in Table 2; within the threshold of 0.9), VIF smaller than 5.3
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(smaller than the threshold 10) and tolerance greater than 0.19 (larger than the
threshold 0.1). Methodologists argue that multi-collinearity is inevitable when
dummy variables are used (Hair et al., 2009) and unavoidable in statistical
analysis (Field, 2009). As a result, we retain all the variables and address the
relations in our analysis.
<Table 2>
3.4. Analytical Methods
We test our hypotheses using two statistical methods. We first conduct a
Wilcoxon signed-rank test to respond hypothesis one (question one): nations'
patent systems have integrated with international patent systems. This
analytical method allows us to identify the gaps between the actual and
intended patent system. We, then, used an ANOVA test to address hypothesis
two (addressing question two): to what extent patent system development
diverges across the world.

3.5. Reliability and Validity
The reliability of this research is four-fold. First, a conceptual and operational
framework was established to guide data collection and pilot study with WIPO
experts. Second, we followed a protocol throughout the research process from
research design, data collection procedures, data coding, analysis and
interpretation. Third, we have documented the study database from the base
materials (e.g., raw data and documents) to written materials (e.g., synthesis
notes). Finally, reliability test yields Cronbach's alpha scores of 0.91, 0.71 and
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0.72 (see Table 1), showing that our method measures what it intends to
measure.
The study also demonstrates construct, internal and external validities. It
uses multiple sources of evidence, including data sourced from WIPO, the
WTO and national governments as well as from an experience survey and
focus group interviews. A chain of evidence was established toward the
construct validity, including database, citations, study protocol, face validity
and operationalization with the findings validated by WIPO directors.
4. RESULTS
Table 3 reports the gaps between national and international institutions in
terms of patent system development across the three components (i.e., actual
and intended integration toward international standards). The non-parametric
test allows us to compare the three pairs of means. If countries fully complied
with the international patent standards, the scores across countries for different
variables would be 1. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test, however, indicates all
the comparative factors show significant differences (p<0.000) between
intended and actual integration levels, and effect sizes for all the comparative
factors show above the 0.05 levels.
<Table 3>
The results of negative ranks show a large gap between international
patent system and national patent systems, implying global patent integration
has not taken place. Meanwhile, the effect size for the three components
suggests that international efforts toward global patent integration have had
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significant effect on member states. The development of patent mechanism
shows an effect size at 0.92 followed by patent administration at 0.87 and
patent enforcement at 0.85. The results indicate that the development is
apparently visible among countries to introduce new patent laws and organize
training for patent officials. To establish a new patent system, for example,
countries have spent at least U.S.$1.5 million (Maskus, 2000) to guarantee that
the patent office functions, human powers are available, and judicial system is
in place for patent activities.
In summary, our findings refute H1. We conclude that nations’ patent
systems are not integrated with the international patent systems. Nations have
not met the minimum requirements stipulated by international organizations.
However, international organizations’ effort on integrating nations is highly
recognized in the process rather than in the outcome, and patent systems
across the world remain nation-based.
Table 4 shows the varied patent system development between the three
components and across the countries. Post hoc testing indicates that all the
constructs have different population means based on the 88-country sample
analysis (i.e., the findings based on the sample represent those based on the
population). In terms of the extent of development, it is apparent that patent
mechanism is more advanced than the other two components and enforcement
has made the slowest progress.
<Table 4>
The results support hypotheses 2a and 2b. As argued in H2a, nations are
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more likely to be more developed in patent mechanism than in the other two
areas of patent system; H2b: nations are likely to be more developed in patent
administration than in patent enforcement. The results are in line with the
finding relevant to H1 that international efforts toward global patent integration
have had significant effect on member states. This is not only reflected in
treaties, agreements and conventions becoming the ‘templates’ of legislation,
but more importantly is evidenced in the active involvement of WIPO and the
WTO in training human resources, and creating opportunities for nations to
exchange views and experience. The results suggest strengthened patent
administration across countries over the past years.
Different from patent administration, patent enforcement appears to be
culture-bound. Each nation’s patent enforcement is embedded within its own
legal system. It requires resources (particularly time and human power) to
accumulate experience (e.g., antecedents, skilled lawyers and judges). Given
most WTO members are developing countries, time factor to enforce patent
systems plays an important role.
The relative frequency of the mean scores further demonstrates the
varied development across the three areas of patent systems and across
countries (Figure 2). The sample skews heavily toward the upper end of the
scale for patent mechanism (0.91-1), indicating nearly 90% of the nations have
mechanism compliance in place. For patent administration, the distribution
spreads relatively evenly from 0.61 to 1, suggesting that nations have made
efforts toward the development, though in a diverse manner. The distance
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toward one another is relatively comparable, and further commitment is
required from governments in this area. As for patent enforcement, the sample
largely scatters between 0.51 and 0.7, indicating larger distance between
international and national institutions. Such variations also demonstrate that
most countries are moderate enforcers of patent rights, and have considerable
room for improvement.
< Figure 2>
5. DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
5.1. Findings in Comparison to Prior Research
This paper examines the integration and divergence of patent systems between
national and international institutions with two questions addressed: (1) Have
nations integrated their patent systems development under the influence of
international institutions? (2) How are the three components of the patent
systems compared and contrasted in terms of development across nations?
Based on the study of 88 members screened from the WTO membership,
our findings show that the patent system is yet to be integrated across the
world. It refutes hypothesis 1 and asserts that nations remain different in their
own institutions. The result is in line with Massel (1973) that despite the
efforts by national and international institutions over the past years, there has
been no impact on the outcome of integration. Our evidence shows that
international institutions have had strong influence on global integration,
particularly in the development of patent mechanism (with effect size at 0.92,
0.85 for enforcement, 0.87 for administration). The findings disconfirm prior

26

research (Bosworth, 1980; Ferrantino, 1993; Ginarte & Park, 1997; Sherwood,
1997) that ratifying treaties, conventions and agreements represents nations’
integration with the rest of the world. This variable was insignificant in
influencing integration at the factorial analysis stage. One possible
explanation, in line with Deardorff (1992), is that countries are unlikely to
have similar demands for patent protection due to their different expectations
for invented goods. Different behaviors toward patent administration and
enforcement yield different results. The other explanation is associated with
TRIPS’ dominant role. Over the past decade, it appears that TRIPS has
become more important a gauging factor for patent integration than any other
treaties, conventions, and agreements; thus rendering irrelevance the number
of ratifications. This result allows us to confirm that international institutions
have strong impact on the process of integration by nations.
Regarding question 2, our findings also show that the three components of
patent systems do not advance in equal stance and there have been different
degrees of development across countries resulting in our support for H2a and
H2b. Patent mechanism takes a center stage of development for most countries
(90% of the countries examined have established TRIPS-based patent
mechanism), indicating greater effort toward global integration than patent
administration. The findings show that patent administration is diversely
operational across countries, but still on average, more advanced development
than enforcement (most countries are moderate enforcers). These findings
corroborate prior research that countries’ patent mechanism tends to be the

27

most developed (Ostergard, 2000; Sherwood, 1997). Our results also confirm
that nations are more developed in patent administration than in patent
enforcement. This finding aligns with our logical argument and prior work by
Ostergard (2000) that enforcement is difficult to implement and takes time to
evolve due to the need for accumulating knowledge and experience.
The findings confirm prior research that enforcement is a factor to
consider for improvement across nations, but taking prior research further, this
study compares and contrasts these three components and identifies the degree
of development. In particular, our findings clarify that the difference across
countries in patent administration lies in nations’ way of operations. Patent
enforcement does not form a significant cross-country divide due to most
countries being moderate enforcers, but a wide gap of national-international
institutions. This result contests Sherwood (1997) that patent administration is
the weakest and the contradiction is probably due to Sherwood’s study having
a small sample and different timeline of examination. Nowadays, countries are
more active in establishing new patent administration, as evidenced by the
increasing number of countries setting up patent offices.

5.2. Managerial Relevance
Our findings provide policy makers with implications for IB practice. They set
a general direction of policy development for national and international patent
organizations. Global comparison enables international organizations to
examine in which areas (mechanism, administration or enforcement)
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improvements should be so that they can effectively support countries to
develop nation-based patent systems. National organizations can use the
framework to examine their country’s performance in comparison to others,
thus helping them set strategic patent policy targets. This pragmatic approach
is proposed based on the reality that nations tend to use ‘model’ countries as
inspirations (e.g., U.S. for China; South Africa for African countries).
This research has also provided managerial implications from IB
perspectives. First, managers may assess the factors proposed in the
framework between home and host countries to identify gaps of patent
systems and formulate strategies of defense and prevention for patent
protection in the host country environment. For instance, if a comparative
analysis reveals that the host country has no criminal proceedings to deal with
counterfeiting, it would send a signal to managers that penalty is not severe
enough to eradicate counterfeiters. The manager will thus have to consider
whether and how to allocate resources to protect patents at the corporate level
and to collaborate with government organizations to safeguard corporate
interests. Second, through a comparative analysis of home and host country
patent systems, companies can link findings with corporate knowledge and
experience to assess the feasibility of strategic options for cross-border patent
activities. For example, by comparing the patent system at home and host
countries, managers are able to detect how different the legislation is and how
fast a patent can be granted. Accordingly, they are able to decide what
resources they should allocate for patent granting, thus, controlling the timing
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of patent commercialization. This is crucial given most commercialization
takes place at around patent granting time (Gans, Hsu & Stern, 2007). Third,
this framework will help managers identify the strengths and weaknesses of
patent system development in a host country, thus leveraging costs and
benefits of strategic options. That is, they will be able to, decide whether they
should opt for arm’s length licensing or total control over the ownership to
maximize patent value based on the assessment of the host country’s patent
system environment.
5.3. Contributions
This study advances knowledge in two-fold by establishing a comprehensive
framework to assess patent systems across countries. First, it enriches
understanding toward the institutional theory from the perspective of a formal
institution - patent systems. It confirms that the integral and influential nature
of international institutions on national institutions is in the effort and process
rather than the actual outcome of integration; and global integration is more an
option and prospect rather than an obligation due to the nation-based nature of
patent systems. As a consequence, nations may take proactive or reactive
approaches to comply with international institutions based on their needs and
interests. The study consolidates the foundations of institution-based view that
nations’ formal institutions form constraints for global patent integration.
Second, it extends prior research to clarify the different degree of
development across the three areas of patent system. This enriches the
theoretical understanding of international institutions being functional in the
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interests of nations. We are able to understand that patent mechanism is in
place for member states. Patent administration across countries is
operationally diverse and requires coordination. Patent enforcement across
nations is consistently moderate, and there is large room for improvement.
Our empirical contribution is reflected in our effort to examine all the
WTO members and use the WIPO and WTO international patent institutions
to gauge nations’ patent system development. This appears to be the first
effort to systematically use WIPO and WTO standards to measure patent
systems, and thus aligns with the world trend toward global patent system
‘benchmarking’. This contribution thus highlights the interconnected nature of
national and international institutions and emphasizes the inadequacy of only
considering national environments as institutions. Such contributions advance
prior research that adopted the developed countries’ patent institutions to
examine developing countries’ progress. While we should acknowledge the
impact of major developed nations on the formation of international patent
institutions, international patent institutions have become relevant with the
intensive involvement of developing countries in recent years. Although our
final sample only includes 88 members, we have examined the entire
population of the WTO membership and only selected nations with complete
datasets. The study, thus, is a starting point to examine the impact of
international patent institutions on national institutions.
We make methodological contribution by proposing and exploring a
comprehensive framework for global patent systems to aid our understanding
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as to how international and national patent systems integrate and diverge. The
introduction of the three-component examination of patent systems asserts the
role of patent laws, but more importantly confirms the significance of
enforcement and governmental administration of patents. Moreover, our
framework allows decomposable patent system development measurements.
This feature progresses prior research because it allows researchers and
practitioners to focus on specific patent system development components
according to their needs. For example, given China is constantly criticized for
having weak enforcement, the Chinese government and interested researchers
may examine the specific areas that can be improved to shake off the ‘weak
enforcer’ image. Moreover, our sample includes some emerging economies
(e.g., BRIC and Eastern Europe); thus enriching prior research setting and
making these dynamic economies represented in the study.
5.4. Limitations and Further Research
This study has weaknesses to overcome through future research. First, further
investigation is both feasible and necessary to confirm our integrated
framework. With time, more members are obliged to conform to TRIPS, richer
data will become available for further analysis. Second, there are gaps in
statute and practice particularly for the enforcement component. Our indices
were scored based on country enforcement reports, but it is unclear whether
these reports entirely reflect actual practices. Future research can survey
practitioners associated with patent system development and find out whether
external survey scores correlate with our scores.
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Third, patent system development is nation-based, and countries continue
to differ no matter how great their efforts are toward integration with
international standards. This individuality means that nation-based cases need
to be incorporated. For example, studies of countries like the UK, Germany,
U.S, China, India and Brazil will provide readers with an understanding of the
challenges and opportunities in a comparative manner. Finally, the changing
nature of patent system development dictates the need for serializing data.
With longitudinal data being accumulated, rich resources will be available to
investigate the degree of integration and divergence, thus predicting
development trends and enriching patent-related IB research and practice.

AKNOWLEGEMENT
We would like to acknowledge the JWB Editor-in-Chief - Professor John
Slocum. His efficiency defines the prominence of what we have long felt one
of the best journals in the international business field. We are grateful to the
JWB editor – Professor Yadong Luo for his guidance and inspiration and the
two anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments to help us improve
the quality of this paper. We sincerely appreciate all the WIPO and WTO
officers for the insights of their knowledge and experience.
REFERENCES
Allred, B.B. & Park, W.G. (2007). Patent rights and innovative activity:
Evidence from national and firm-level data. Journal of International
Business Studies, 38 (6): 878-900.
Björkman, I., Fey, C. & Park, H. J. (2007). Institutional theory and MNC
subsidiary HRM practices: Evidence from a three-country study. Journal of
International Business Studies, 38(3): 430-446.
Bosworth, D. (1980). The transfer of US technology abroad. Research Policy,
9 (1980): 378-388
Bosworth, D. & Yang, D. (2000). Intellectual property law, technology flow
and licensing opportunities in China. International Business Review, 9 (4):

33

453-477.
Bowerman, B. L. & O'connell, R.T. (1990). Linear statistical models: An
applied approach. Belmont: Duxbury.
Caporaso, J. A. (1992). International relations theory and multilateralism: The
search for foundations. International Organization, 46 (3): 599-632.
Chao, M. C-H. & Kumar, V. (2010). The impact of institutional distance on
the international diversity–performance relationship. Journal of World
Business, 45 (1): 68-79.
Chung, C. C. & Beamish, P. W. (2005). The impact of institutional reforms on
characteristics and survival of foreign subsidiaries in emerging economies.
Journal of Management Studies, 42(1): 35-62.
Cooper, D.R. & Schindler, P.S. (2006). Business research methods. London:
McGraw-Hill Irwin.
Council for TRIPS (1997). Checklist of issues on enforcement: Responses
from the US. Geneva: WTO
Deardorff, A.V. (1992). Welfare effects of global patent protection.
Economica, 59 (233): 35-51
Delios, A. & Henisz, W.J. (2003). Political hazards, experience, and sequential
entry strategies: The international expansion of Japanese firms, 1980-1998.
Strategic Management Journal, 24 (11): 1153-1164
Eden, L. (2010). Lifting the veil on how institutions matter in IB research.
Journal of International Business Studies, 41 (2): 175-177.
Ferrantino, M.J. (1993). The effect of IPRs on international trade and
investment. Review of World Economics, 129, 300-331
Field, A. (2009) Discovering statistics using SPSS. London: Sage.
Gaba, V., Pan, Y. & Ungson, G.R. (2002). Timing of entry in international
market: An empirical study of U.S. Fortune 500 firms in China. Journal of
International Business Studies, 33(1): 39-55.
Gans, J.S., Hsu, D.H. & Stern, S. (2007). The impact of uncertain IPRs on the
market for ideas: Evidence from patent grant delays. Academy of
Management Annual Meeting: Doing Well by Doing Good,
Philadelphia, August 3-8.
Gao, G.Y., Murray, J.Y., Kotabe, M. & Lu, J. (2010). A ‘strategy tripod’
perspective on export behaviors: evidence from domestic and foreign firms
based in an emerging economy. Journal of International Business Studies,
41 (3): 377-396.
Ghauri, P.N. & Rao, P.M. (2009). Intellectual property, pharmaceutical MNEs
and the developing world. Journal of World Business, 44 (2): 206-215
Ginarte, J.C. & Park, W.G. (1997). Determinant of patent rights: A cross
national study. Research Policy, 26 (3): 283-301.
Griffith, D. (2010). Understanding multi-level institutional convergence
effects on international market segments and global marketing strategy.
Journal of World Business, 45 (1): 59-67.
Hagedoorn, J., Cloodt, D. & Kranenburg, H.V. (2005). Intellectual property
rights and the governance of international R&D partnerships. Journal of
International Business Studies, 36(2): 175-186.

34

Hair, J. F.J., Black, W.C., Babin, B.J., Anderson, R.E. & Tatham, R.L. (2009).
Multivariate data analysis. Upper Saddle River: Pearson-Prentice Hall.
Hoskisson, R.E., Eden, L., Lau, C.M. & Wright, M. (2000). Strategy in
emerging economy. Academy of Management Journal, 43(3): 249-267.
Khoury, T.A. & Peng, M.W. (2011). Does institutional reform of intellectual
property rights lead to more inbound FDI? Evidence from Latin America
and the Caribbean. Journal of World Business, 46 (3): 337-345.
Kiggundu, M.N., Jorgensen, J.J. & Hafsi, T. (1983). Administrative theory and
practice in developing countries: A synthesis. Administrative Science
Quarterly, 28 (1): 66-84.
Li, S. & Filer, L. (2007). The effects of the governance environment on the
choice of investment mode and the strategic implications. Journal of World
Business, 42(1): 80-98.
Luo, Y. (2001). Determinants of entry in an emerging economy: a multilevel
approach. Journal of Management Studies, 38(3): 443-472.
Maskus, K.E. (2000). Intellectual property in the global economy.
Washington: Institute for International Economics.
Massel, M. (1973). The international patent system. Journal of Economic
Issues, 7, 645-664
McGaughey, S.L., Liesch, P.W. & Poulson, D. (2000). An unconventional
approach to intellectual property protection: The case of an Australian firm
transferring shipbuilding technologies to China. Journal of World
Business, 35 (1): 1-20.
Meyer, K.E., Estrin, S., Bhaumik, S.K. & Peng, M.W. (2009). Institutions,
resources, and entry strategies in emerging economies. Strategic
Management Journal, 20(1): 61-80.
Ostergard, R.L. (2000). The measurement of IP rights protection. Journal of
International Business Studies, 31 (2): 349-360
Oxley, J.E. (1999). Institutional environment and the mechanisms of
governance: The impact of intellectual property protection on the structure
of inter-firm alliances. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
38(3): 283-309.
Peng, M. (2003). Institutional transitions and strategic choices. Academy of
Management Review, 28, 275-296.
Peng, M.W., Wang, D.Y. & Jiang, Y. (2008). An institution-based view of
international business strategy: A focus on emerging economies. Journal of
International Business Studies, 39 (17): 920-936.
Rapp, R. & Rozek, R.P. (1990). Benefits and costs of IP in developing
countries. Journal of World Trade, 6 (2): 75-102.
Robson, C. (2002). Real world research (2nd edition) Oxford: Blackwell.
Roy, J.-P. & Oliver, C. (2009). International joint venture partner selection:
The role of the host-country legal environment. Journal of International
Business Studies, 40 (2009): 779-801.
Ruggie, J. G. (1992). Multilateralism: the anatomy of an institution.
International Organization, 46, 561.
Rugman, A. M. & Verbeke, A. (1998). Multinational enterprises and public

35

policy. Journal of International Business Studies, 29(1): 115-136.
Saunders, M., Lewis, P. & Thornhill, A. (2009). Research methods for
business students. London: Prentice Hall.
Scholte, J. A. (2001). In the globalization of world politics. In , J. Baylis & S.
Smith (Eds.), The globalization of world politics (pp. 13-34). New York:
Oxford University Press.
Scott, W.R. (2001). Institution and organization. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
Sherwood, R.M. (1997). IP systems and investment stimulation: The rating of
systems in eighteen developing countries. IDEA: The Journal of Law and
Technology, 37 (2): 261-370
Slangen, A. H. L. & Beugelsdijk, S. (2010). The impact of institutional
hazards on foreign market activity: A contingency perspective. Journal of
International Business Studies, 41 (6):980-995.
United States State Department (1989-1995). Annual report: Country reports
on economic and trade practices. Washington DC.: Superintendent of
Documents.
Walder, A. (1995). Local governments as industrial firms: an organizational
analysis of China's transition economy. American Journal of Psychology,
101(2): 263-301.
Weismann, M. F. (2010). Regulating unlawful behavior in the global
business environment: The functional integration of sovereignty and
multilateralism. Journal of World Business, 45 (3): 312-321.
WIPO (2005). IP audit tool. Geneva: WIPO.
Wright, M., Filatotchev, I., Hoskisson, R.E. & Peng, M. W. (2005). Strategy
research in emerging economies: Challenging the conventional wisdom.
Journal of Management Studies, 42(1): 1-33.
WTO (1995). Trade related aspects of IP rights. WTO, Geneva
Yang, D. (2005). Culture matters to multinationals' intellectual property
businesses. Journal of World Business, 40(3): 281-301.

36

Table 1: Conceptualization and Operationalization – Patent Mechanism, Administration and Enforcement
Component & Variable

Enforcement (α = 0.70)

Administration (α = 0.71)

Mechanism (α = 0.91)

1.
2.

6.

Product &Process Inventions
Novelty, Inventiveness &
Utility
Rights Conferred for Product
Patents
Rights Conferred for Process
Patents
Rights Conferred for
Transactions
Patent Protection Duration

7.

Transparency

8.

Frequency of Patent Law
Revision
Timescale to Grant Patents

3.
4.
5.

9.

10. Patent Educational Institutions
11. Non-Patent Stipulations
12. Non-Infringement Stipulations
13. Compulsory Licensing
14. Judicial Review of Patent
Application
15. Civil Judicial Procedures &
Remedies
16. Administrative Procedures &
Remedies
17. Provisional Judicial Measures
18. Provisional Administrative
Measures
19. Border Measures
20. Criminal Procedure
21. Court Available for Disputes

Conceptual Justification

Operational Delineation

Countries must protect product and process inventions in the law
Three conditions for patentability set out by WIPO and the WTO

Both inventions: 1; one missing: deduct 0.5; no protection: 0
Full patentability: 1; one missing: deduct 0.333; no patentability: 0

Countries must stipulate exclusive rights to prevent third parties without owner consent from
making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing patented product inventions
Countries must stipulate exclusive rights to prevent third parties without owner consent from
using, offering for sale, selling, or importing patented process inventions
The owners should have the right to assign, or transfer by succession, the patent and to conclude
licensing contracts
Members should stipulate that the duration of patent protection is 20 years upon filing

Complete stipulation: 1; one missing: deduct 0.20; no stipulation: 0

Patent law in English and in native language is available online and this demonstrates equal
treatment to foreign and local inventors
Revisions of patent laws since 1995 demonstrate government efforts to improve patent
mechanisms based on TRIPS standards
The speed of granting shows government efficiency in disseminating knowledge, helps owners
focus on inventive exploitation & minimize anxiety while the patent is pending;
IP education reflects the IP awareness of the general public, or the potential to have such
awareness; Both help intensify demand for IP protection
Members are required to set exceptions and limitations in line with each nation’s tradition and
interests. This includes stipulations as to what is excluded for patenting grants
Nations are required to stipulate what is considered non-infringement
Nations should stipulate compulsory licensing to enforce non-voluntary technology transfer
Judicial review of patent applications (e.g., rejected application by the patent office) should be
available
Court functions, evidence presentation, remedies for damage, compensation for wrong
enjoinments, and costs and timeframe for implementation are available
The administrative functions, evidence presentation, remedies for damage, compensation for
wrong enjoinments and costs and timeframe for implementation are available

Full availability: 1; law in one language: 0.5; no law: 0

Authorize provisional judicial measures to prevent infringements and preserve their evidence,
including the length of time and costs involved and indemnification of injuries
Authorize provisional administrative measures to prevent infringements and preserve evidence,
including the length of time and costs involved and indemnification of injuries
Allow owners to apply to Customs to suspend pirated product import with valid evidence
Have jurisdiction over criminal offences, and criminal procedures and penalties for infringements
Nations are required to report their court support for patent to the WTO and WIPO; Courts should
be available to handle patent related disputes

Complete stipulation: 1; one missing: deduct 0.25; no stipulation: 0
Complete stipulation: 1; One missing: deduct 0.333; no stipulation: 0
20-year: 1; each missing year, reduce 0.05; no protection: 0

Revision takes place after 1995 (inc. 1995): 1; no revision: 0
Timescale clearly indicated: 1; no stipulation: 0
Education Institution Available: 1; Unavailable: 0
Exceptions and limitations are stipulated: 1; only exceptions or
limitations: 0.50; no stipulations: 0
Non-infringements stipulations are listed: 1; Otherwise: 0
Compulsory licensing provision stipulated: 1; No: 0
If applicants are given rights to appeal judicially for their rejected
patent application: 1; otherwise: 0.
Complete functions: 1; one missing: deduct 0.2; no functions: 0
Complete function: 1; one missing: deduct 0.2; no function: 0
Complete function: 1; one missing: deduct 0.2; no function: 0
Complete function: 1; one missing: deduct 0.2; no function: 0
Yes: 1; No: 0.
Complete criminal procedure: 1; one missing: deduct 0.3333; no
function: 0
Patent disputes resolution court available: 1; otherwise: 0

Notes: The above variables are selected based mainly on WIPO and WTO stipulations. The reliability of the measurements is justified on two counts. Firstly, the internal consistency shows that all
variables lump together in a reliable manner toward the three main factors resulting in Cronbach’s Alpha (α ) at 0.91, 0.71 and 0.70 respectively. Secondly, we have consulted experts within WIPO
regarding the variable selection and relevance. This inter-rater approach allows us to finalize the framework based on their comments, and to have an assurance from them about the consistency of the
framework.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Variables

Mean

S.D.

1

1. Product & Process Inventions

0.97

0.17

1.00

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

2. Novelty, Inventiveness & Utility

0.95

0.18

.81***

1.00

3. Rights Conferred for Product
Inventions
4. Rights Conferred for Process
Inventions
5.Rights Conferred for Transactions

0.93

0.23

.61***

.50***

1.00

0.92

0.26

.66***

.49***

.83***

1.00

0.93

0.20

.76***

.60***

.56***

.56***

1.00

6.Patent Protection Duration

0.96

0.20

.67***

.59***

.56***

.72***

.58***

1.00

7.Transparency

0.64

0.39

0.14

0.17

0.15

0.14

.24*

.28**

1.00

8. Frequency of Revision

0.58

0.50

.22*

0.15

0.14

0.14

.24*

0.16

.42***

1.00

9.Timescale to Grant Patents

0.82

0.37

.29**

.27*

.32**

.39***

.49***

.40***

0.18

0.06

1.00

10. Educational Institutions for IP

0.77

0.42

.23*

.30**

0.14

0.09

.21*

0.15

.30**

.30**

0.14

1.00

11. Non-patentable Stipulations

0.92

0.27

.51***

.49***

.40***

.36**

.49***

.36**

.26*

0.19

.31**

.33**

1.00

12. Non-infringement Stipulations

0.78

0.40

.29**

.32**

.32**

.39***

.31**

.39***

.21*

0.16

.43***

0.03

.21*

1.00

13. Compulsory Licensing Provisions

0.82

0.35

.40***

.54***

0.16

0.18

.31**

.22*

0.06

0.16

0.17

.32**

.48***

.26*

1.00

14. Judicial Review of Patent
Application
15. Civil and Judicial Procedures &
Remedies

0.92

0.28

.45***

.46***

.31**

.26*

.31**

.35**

0.12

.24*

.30**

.22*

.36**

0.14

.32**

1.00

0.79

0.14

.54***

.57***

.34**

.32**

.44***

.46***

0.19

0.07

0.15

.39***

.47***

.28**

.28**

.32**

1.00

16. Administrative Procedures &
Remedies
17. Provisional Judicial Measures

0.28

0.44

0.03

0.12

0.16

0.12

0.11

0.15

0.14

-0.04

0.10

0.14

0.08

-0.05

0.02

0.20

0.18

1.00

0.77

0.17

.31**

.25*

.21*

0.13

.25*

0.20

0.18

0.01

0.02

0.14

0.18

0.04

0.12

0.12

.40***

0.14

1.00

18. Provisional Administrative
Measures
19. Border Measures

0.19

0.36

0.09

0.14

0.15

0.15

0.10

0.12

0.10

0.01

0.15

0.13

0.04

0.00

0.02

0.16

0.06

.65***

0.15

1.00

0.53

0.28

.27*

.22*

.32**

.33**

.36**

.25*

.25*

.22*

.31**

.21*

.31**

0.19

0.03

.25*

.32**

0.14

.37**

.22*

1.00

20. Criminal Procedure

0.74

0.22

.22*

0.18

.23*

0.19

0.13

0.18

0.05

-0.07

0.01

0.07

.32**

0.01

0.04

0.07

.41***

0.15

0.20

0.15

.25*

1.00

21. Court Available for Disputes

0.91

0.29

0.18

0.13

0.18

0.13

0.15

0.13

0.12

-0.03

-0.04

0.11

0.19

-0.03

-0.05

0.05

.27*

0.12

.29**

0.16

0.19

.38***

Significance level at *P<0.05; **P<0.01; ***P<0.001
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Table 3: Degree of Global Patent Integration

Comparing
Factors
Patent
MechanismActual and
Intended

Patent
Administration Actual and
Intended

Patent
Enforcement Actual and
Intended

Ranks

Observation

Mean
Rank

Sum of
Ranks

Negative
Ranks
Positive
Ranks
Ties
Total
Negative
Ranks
Positive
Ranks
Ties
Total
Negative
Ranks
Positive
Ranks
Ties
Total

88a

44.50

3916.00

0b

.00

.00

88a

44.50

3916.00

0b

.00

.00

88a

44.50

3916.00

0b

.00

.00

Test
Statistics(2)

Effect Size

-8.583 (.000)

-0.915

-8.157(.000)

-0.870

-8.006 (.000)

-0.852

0c
88

0c
88

0c
88

Notes:
(1) a: Actual < Intended; b: Actual > Intended; c: Actual = Intended (full compliance with international standard);
(2) The Wilcoxon signed-rank test shows the Z score based on positive ranks for each comparison and significance in
bracket.
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Table 4: Multiple Comparison Using ANOVA Randomized Block Design

Between-Subjects Effects
Sum of
Source
Squares
Model
171.216(1)
Constructs
4.024
Countries
5.638
Error
3.475
Total
174.691
Multiple Comparisons
Factors(2)
2
3
1
3
1
2

1
2
3

DF
90
2
87
174
264

Mean
Square
1.902
2.012
.065
.020

Mean
Difference

S.E.

p

.182
.302
-.182
.120
-.302
-.120

.0213
.0213
.0213
.0213
.0213
.0213

.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000

F

P

95.253
100.746
3.245

.000
.000
.000

95% Confidence Interval
Lower
Upper
Bound
Bound
.130
.231
.250
.351
-.231
-.130
.070
.171
-.351
-.250
-.171
-.070

Notes:
2

2

(1) R = .980 (Adjusted R = .970)
(2) 1 = Patent Mechanism (mean = 0.943); 2 = Patent Administration (mean = 0.761);
3 = Patent Enforcement (mean = 0.641)
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Figure 1: Conceptual Framework – Patent Systems within Institutions

Patent
Mechanism
Patent
Administration

Patent
Enforcement

National Institutions

International Institutions
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